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It was only a matter of time before a Bourdieuian discovered musical auditions. In 
biographical accounts of musical careers, whatever the genre, successful auditions for major 
professional gigs are frequently identified as decisive turning points; it would take very little to 
cast them as formalized bids for position-taking in the field of cultural production. However, in 
“Mastering the Jazz Standard”, Erik Nylander avoids this unimaginative argument, which 
amounts to little more than a simple variation on a familiar tune. Instead he seizes on auditions 
for admission to music schools, which allowed him to create a medley of Bourdieu’s greatest 
hits. Social reproduction, the autonomization of the cultural field, the doxa, habitus, and the 
charismatic ideology are woven together into an impressive counterpoint; the twist comes in how 
Lucien Karpik’s economic sociology, as well as Boltanski and Thévenot’s “regimes of worth”, 
are brought into the mix.  
While Nylander might have brought in some new material, the well-worn refrains kept 
coming back. Jury members are not experts, they are “gatekeepers”; their task is not to identify 
pupils with the most potential but to “guard” the jazz tradition and select their “heirs”. Only 
those with the right background can navigate the minefield that is the auditioning process; what 
the jurors recognize is not talent but inherited capital, which gets dressed up in a mystical 
discourse about the “heroic” or “inspirational” personality. A less imaginative analyst might 
have settled for revealing how the myth of the rarity of talent justifies exclusion, but Nylander 
goes for a bigger finish; these “ineffable notions of uniqueness and singularity” allow artistic 
evaluation to “evade bureaucratic and political principles of justification”.  
Other readers might admire Nylander for having mastered the standard Bourdieuian 
account, but those seeking a more cultural argument will have trouble getting past the sour notes. 
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My critique will focus on three fundamental weaknesses before outlining an alternative approach 
to this rich and important topic.  
The first weakness in Nylander’s analysis stems from his treatment of musical value. As 
a Bourdieuian, he rejects the idea that artistic judgments are achieved by marshalling specialized 
knowledge or that they demand particular competencies; neither does he accept that those 
judgments presuppose an objective framework through which they can be exercised. 
Accordingly, his aim is first to reveal the falsely-naturalized criteria that inform judgments and 
then to show how the determination of value only serves to reinforce an existing structure of 
privilege. This position drives the methodological strategy of operationalized suspicion. The 
priority is to find discrepancies between what jurors say and what they do; when Nylander does 
pay attention to what jurors say, either in situ or in an interview setting, it is to reveal the 
“underlying hierarchies” hidden in their musical discourse.  
This “watchdog” role, in which the sociologist sniffs out the “uncritical and unreflective 
assumptions about the music itself” – or in this case how it should be performed – has been 
heralded as one of the key contributions of our discipline in the study of contemporary popular 
music (Prior 2011). But this watchdog has more bark than bite. The approach falls prey to the 
same “performative contradiction” of which Habermas accused Foucault; the “view from 
nowhere” assumed in order to propose a disinterested description of evaluation depends on an 
epistemological presumption (i.e., the suspicion of universalist claims) that cannot be sustained. 
It inevitably becomes a “view from everywhere” because its challenge to the valorization of 
certain musical qualities gives into an absurd form of pluralism; when everything is valued 
equally, nothing is valued at all. Ultimately, a critique that cannot account for its own normative 
foundation amounts to little more than arbitrary partisanship. 
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A second weakness arises from the conceptualization of musicality as a form of habitus. 
Drawing selectively from interview data, Nylander divides musical performance into profane and 
sacred aspects. Melody, harmony and rhythm are lumped together into “rule-following 
procedures”; these mere “technical skills” are deemed profane because it is presumed that they 
can be taught. What is sacralized are the “abstract qualities” that resist codification; these 
romantic notions of inspired originality and personal expression are held to constitute artistic 
singularity. With this dichotomy in place, Nylander goes on to identify three types of candidate: 
the most common are the epigones who can do no more than follow the rules and are usually 
eliminated for that reason; more unusual are the heretics who disqualify themselves from the 
game by flouting or showing ignorance of the rules; but the rarest are the “heroic personalities” 
who can transcend the rules because they have a “feel for the game”. 
It is a typically Bourdieuian move; by inventing the category of “rule-following 
procedures”, musical performance becomes another mode of unconsciously strategic action. But 
there are two problems with this category. The first is that it confuses technical facility (the 
execution of songs on a musical instrument or with the voice) with knowledge of music theory 
(the understanding of how songs are put together). The latter is tested in auditions when the 
candidates take the role of band leader. Arranging songs requires some familiarity with harmony, 
style and instrumentation. For all its shortcomings Becker’s (1982) term, “convention”, is more 
suitable here; for example, the “rules” of harmony in jazz’s adaptation of functional tonality 
serve more as guidelines for creating chord progressions (changes) and crafting the voice leading 
in accompaniment figures and melodic lines so that the result is both idiomatic and pleasing to 
the ear. This sort of music-analytical ability is demonstrated in a different way in the candidate’s 
performance through the motivic and rhythmic variations spun out in improvised solos.  
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Knowledge of these compositional techniques is quite different from the “technique” that 
refers to complex physical co-ordination and command of the musical instrument. Singing or 
playing higher, faster and louder than everyone else has very little to do with rule-following 
procedures, which brings us to Nylander’s second mistake; a superb technique is anything but 
profane. Virtuosity is thought to be unrelated to musicality, and yet it can inspire just as intense 
an admiration; even hardened professionals cannot deny the excitement of witnessing a young 
musician navigate a fiendishly difficult piece with ease. Musicality is neither the only ineffable 
quality nor the sole form of heroism in the artistic world. The virtuoso is often described through 
superhuman and supernatural metaphors along with a charismatic mythology that comes in at 
least two versions; one revolves around demonic pacts (e.g., the Robert Johnson crossroads 
myth) but the other is a triumph narrative in which the obstacle overcome is the conservatism of 
the academy (Mitchell 2000).  
The combination of these two mistakes compromises the upshot of Nylander’s argument. 
He wants to present the romantic discourse of jazz entry – the notion of the player that is “free 
from all structural constraints and as an expression of idiosyncratic personality” – as the “doxic 
principle of artistic valuation”. But for this romantic discourse to perform its ideological 
function, it must be partial and watered down. The “idiosyncratic personality” bears some 
resemblance to the Longinian notion of genius, an idea that took shape in the first century AD 
but was reformulated several times over the course of Western music history (Kivy 2001). This 
concept of genius resonated with eighteenth-century theories of art as expression because it 
describes a powerful figure capable of communicating “weighty thoughts” and imparting to the 
audience a “nobility of mind” that they themselves do not possess (Kivy 2001:16). But while the 
Longinian genius makes the rules, Nylander’s “idiosyncratic personality” just knows how to 
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manipulate them. In the place of the “man of spirit” who is in “command of full-blooded ideas” 
(Kivy 2001:15), we find the candidate who can win the “selection game” because he knows how 
to play the good hand he has been dealt from a loaded deck. The rules of entry into the jazz field 
are thereby revealed to be a rigged game and a despicable racket. Never mind that another image 
of genius lurks in the “sayings” of the musicians interviewed. A Bourdieuian could never find 
the Platonic image of genius even when it stares him in the face because in this conception, 
strategy is irrelevant; the central idea is that there is no rule-governed method or act of will that 
can produce a great idea nor, as is more relevant here, an inspired performance. Training is 
necessary, but not sufficient. Artistic creation happens to the artist; it is not something that can be 
controlled (Kivy 2001:11). 
This is not the only respect in which Nylander mishandles his data. The paper is 
presented as a “study of the audition” (emphasis added) and yet it is never established whether 
the two folk high schools he observed were running typical jazz auditions. How common is it for 
students to participate in the audition process, both as jury members and as players in the “comp 
band” assembled for the occasion? At more advanced levels of jazz education, does only one 
faculty member sit on the jury? Is the numeric grading system a standard procedure mandated by 
the organization? If “comp bands” are also assembled for conservatory auditions, are they also 
permitted to transform the interaction into a kind of musical hazing ritual where they either 
intimidate or make fun of weaker players? It would be surprising to find all these practices at 
higher levels or in the professional world; it is doubtful that they are widely adopted in the 
formalized entry procedures of other musical genres. But it is on the basis of these very practices 
that he is able to characterize auditions as occasions to train the next generation of gatekeepers. 
Also, these innocents are the ones who provide the best evidence for the audition as selection 
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game because they have yet to learn “what to listen for, how to listen for it, and how to valorize 
and verbalize what they have heard”. It is students who argue over the boundaries of “legitimate 
expressions”, and it is the student juror who expresses some awareness (and guilt) about the 
advantage gained with inherited capital. We must take on faith that the reason why these issues 
might not come up with the professionals is because they are fully under the sway of the illusio. 
Despite these weaknesses, Nylander’s study succeeds in highlighting the complexity of 
artistic evaluation and correctly identifies the “structural ambiguity” of auditions as the issue 
demanding sociological explanation. If we were to approach these from a performance 
perspective (Alexander 2004; McCormick 2006), we could overcome the limitations of an 
economistic framework and analyze auditions as “dramatic events” on two levels. On the micro-
level of interaction, the ambiguity would be traced to the definition of the situation. Auditions 
are high-stress occasions, not just because they provide the decisive moment in which all the 
hours of practicing and preparation are put to the test. Like competitions, they are also 
infelicitous occasions because the artificial setting is designed to problematize “dramatic 
realization” (Goffman 1959); the musician performs for the purpose of being judged but in 
conditions that are significantly different from those they would encounter should they be 
selected. Auditions for professional orchestras provide a particularly striking example. 
Depending on the instrument, candidates might be asked to prepare some solo pieces but the core 
of the audition consists of excerpts from the standard orchestral repertoire. If it were not strange 
enough to perform these selections unaccompanied and out of context, candidates must also play 
them on demand from behind a screen.  
Regardless of the genre, what makes the musical interaction in auditions peculiar is the 
absence of audience members. Everyone who attends to listen is there to judge, an arrangement 
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which makes it more difficult for the musician to experience “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi 1991) or 
to achieve “fusion” (Alexander 2004). Musicians are not being over-sensitive when they take 
artistic evaluations personally; musical performance is necessarily also a social performance. 
More to the point, as Auslander (2006:102) has argued, “what musicians perform first and 
foremost is not the music, but their own identities as musicians, their musical personae.” It is not 
just the celebrities of the music world who adopt personae on and off stage; the dutiful 
accompanist and the dependable orchestral “team player” require the same sort of impression 
management. The choice of musical works and their execution serve this persona by providing 
the musical and the visual means of symbolic production.  
Following Auslander we can say that in auditions for music schools, what the jurors are 
evaluating is not only the level of musical proficiency that candidates have achieved, but also the 
personae they have chosen to project. These personae can be meaningful to the extent that they 
embody the images of genius discussed above; but they are also relevant to the juror’s decision 
because they can be seen to indicate what the candidate will be like as a pupil. This helps to 
explain why potential was a recurring theme in Nylander’s interviews and why the candidate’s 
character was so central to artistic evaluation. For example, candidates took themselves out of 
the running if they appeared “too aggressive” by “taking up too much space” or “driving 
everyone else over”. By contrast, candidates who seemed “genuine”, communicative, 
“confident” yet responsive and flexible enough to “respond to cues” gave the impression that 
they were both good musicians and good students.   
At the macro-level, we would trace the structural ambiguity to a contradiction between 
cultural structures. Like competitions, auditions reveal the fundamental incompatibility between 
the aesthetic and civil spheres. Both occasions are designed to give eligible candidates an equal 
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chance. But the end result is a ranking that separates winners and losers and this disjunctive 
effect runs contrary to the communicative union that is held to be the aim of musical 
performance. It is the jurors who must negotiate this incongruity. While they might understand 
musical experience to be subjective in nature and value the affective quality of performance, 
their bureaucratic mandate is to eliminate the majority of candidates in an efficient and consistent 
manner. Rationalized voting systems are increasingly adopted because they are believed to be 
fair and objective. But while educational institutions in democratic societies are pressured to live 
up to these ideals, the aesthetic sphere is ultimately concerned with beauty and truth, and these 
resist quantification. 
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